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[I] t is often the defendant, preferring not to be successfully sued
by anyone, who supposedly undertakes to assist the court in determining whether a putative class should be certified. When it
comes, for instance, to determining whether "the representative
plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class,"... [relying on the defendants] is a bit like permitting a fox,
although with pious countenance, to take charge of the chicken
house.l

CLASS ACTIONS IN many cases provide the only viable means for
large groups of victims of illegal conduct to vindicate their legal
rights. 2 At the same time, the representatives of a class may not always
pursue the interests of the class members adequately. 3 Striking a balance between these two concerns is not always easy because measures
designed to protect class members may have just the opposite effect.
This danger has important implications when the interests of
some of the absent class members are alleged to be in tension with the
interests of some of the representative plaintiffs. In theory, a strict prohibition against any conflict might best protect absent class members'
rights. According to such an approach, the court would not allow one
party to represent another unless their interests align perfectly. A
* Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law. I am grateful once again for
truly extraordinary research by Allison Campos.
**
Shareholder, Berger & Montague, P.C. Mr. Sorensen and Berger & Montague are
among the plaintiffs' counsel in the Valle, Drug case.
1. Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local 130, 657 F.2d 890, 895 (7th
Cir. 1981).
2. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (citing Mace v. Van Ru
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
3. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4) (requiring that "the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class."). See generally 7A CHAR.Es ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1768, at 326-27 (2004); 1 HERBERT
NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLAss ACTIONS § 3.26 (4th ed. 2002).
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court confronted by imperfect class representation could deny class
certification entirely and require injured parties to pursue individual
litigation. 4 Alternatively, the court could certify a class that includes
5
only members who have no potential conflict of interest.
In reality, however, these measures may do more harm than
good. The very parties the court seeks to protect, the absent class
members, may find themselves without anyone to represent their interests at all. Indeed, there may be a tendency for courts to focus on
apparent conflicts even though doing so does not serve the interests
of absent class members.
The reason for this problem is that in many instances alleged
conflicts in potential class actions are identified by defendants. Like
most litigants (other than class representatives), defendants have no
obligation to promote anyone's interests but their own. And the defendants' interests are in most respects antagonistic to those of absent
class members. As a result, defendants' advocacy on behalf of absent
class members is likely to have perverse effects.
On the one hand, when absent class members' interests are in
jeopardy, defendants may have little incentive to object. 6 In fact, the
defendants are likely to be the primary beneficiaries of inadequate
representation. If a conflict of interest causes the named plaintiffs to
fail to fulfill their obligations, it is apt to be because they are not pursuing the legal rights of the absent class members vigorously enough.
Greater vigilance on the part of the defendants in identifying conflicts
would only harm the defendants. In these circumstances, it behooves
the defendants to maintain a stony silence.
On the other hand, defendants have a strong incentive to assert
that a conflict exists between the class representatives and the absent
class members when doing so will minimize the defendants' own liability. Denial of class certification, or the certification of a class with
4. This might occur if a court could not determine which class members would and
which would not be adequately be represented by particular named plaintiffs. See In re
Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 223 F.R.D. 666, 678 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
5. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1194 (11th Cir.
2003) (suggesting this possibility).
6. Defendants may have some reason to protect absent class members' rights, even if
the failure to do so could decrease their liability. For example, absent class members may
object to a settlement that fails to promote their interests adequately. Class action settlements require court approval. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (4) (A) ("Any class member may
object to a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise that requires court
approval under Rule 23(e) (1) (A)."). As a result, the settlement might be rejected by the
trial court or on appeal and, as a result, the defendants would lose the benefit of closure.
Still, the class members' losses are usually the defendants' gains.
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fewer members than the named plaintiffs propose, will help to limit
the defendants' exposure if the absent class members are not in a
position to pursue their legal rights on their own. 7 In these instances,
absent class members will be served best if the court certifies a class,
regardless of whether the interests of all members are aligned perfectly. Yet it is in precisely these circumstances that the defendants are
likely, "with pious countenance,"8 to raise objections on behalf of the
absent class members.
In sum, doctrines aimed at protecting absent class membersparticularly when used by defendants-have the potential to cause
great mischief. This appears to be true of Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva
Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,9 a recent decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. In Valley Drug, the trial court certified a class of plaintiffs in an antitrust case. 10 On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit vacated and remanded.' 1 It did not conclude that class certification was inappropriate, but rather held that additional discovery
may be necessary to determine whether the named plaintiffs were ade12
quate representatives of the class as a whole.
Under prevailing law, the justification for the Eleventh Circuit's
decision would have to be that the court was taking steps necessary to
safeguard the absent class members. 13 However, this Article argues
that the decision tends toward just the opposite effect. The court in
Valley Drug subjected absent class members to costly discovery and
jeopardized the legal rights of the very class members it was supposed
to protect. An explanation of where the Eleventh Circuit went wrong
7. The absent class members may lack the resources to pursue their own claims or
the claims may be so small that they do not warrant individual prosecution. See Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (citing Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109
F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)). Or, the absent class members may be reluctant to vindicate
their legal rights if doing so may damage an ongoing economic relationship. See Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) (citing In re W. Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487
F.2d 191, 198 (9th Cir. 1973); Malcolm E. Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They
Work?, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1319, 1325 (1973)).
8. Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local 130, 657 F.2d 890, 895 (7th
Cir. 1981).
9. 350 F.3d 1181 (l1th Cir. 2003).
10. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 203 F.R.D. 551, 560 (S.D. Fla.
2001).
11.
Valley Drug Co., 350 F.3d at 1196.
12. Id. at 1195-96.
13. See Phillips v. Klassen, 502 F.2d 362, 365-68 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The purpose of Rule
23(a) (4) is to protect the interests of absent class members. See In re Gen. Motors Corp.
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 796 (3d Cir. 1995), cert denied,
516 U.S. 824 (1995).
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in Valley Drug-and how far the opinion strays from existing lawrequires some background on antitrust law and class certification
doctrine.
Part I addresses the relevant antitrust law. In particular, it explains the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois14 to
adopt the direct-purchaser rule, which generally permits only those
who purchased directly from an antitrust violator to recover damages
under the federal antitrust laws. Part II analyzes the standard for class
certification in antitrust cases, focusing on the doctrine pertaining to
potential conflicts of interest between class members. Part III then explains why a proper understanding of antitrust law, and of class certification doctrine, reveals that the Eleventh Circuit was wrong to suggest
that there was a potential conflict of interest between class members
in Valley Drug.
I.

illinois Brick

In Illinois Brick, the United States Supreme Court adopted the so15
called "direct purchaser" rule for antitrust cases under federal law.
The rule provides that in most instances only those entities that purchased goods directly from the participants in an alleged antitrust violation may recover damages. 16 If, for example, a manufacturer of a
brand-name prescription drug inflates the price of its products
through a violation of the antitrust laws, a wholesaler who bought the
drug directly from the manufacturer would be able to recover damages, but a retailer who later bought the drug from the wholesaler
17
could not do so.
Illinois Brich provided the Court an opportunity to reflect upon
the policy decisions that led to its then-recent decision in Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.1 8 Hanover Shoe held that victims
of an antitrust violation generally can recover for the full increase in
the amount they paid for a good or service, regardless of whether they
were able to mitigate their injuries by passing on some or all of their
losses down the chain of distribution. 19 In other words, a wholesaler
that bought brand-name drugs from a manufacturer at an inflated
14. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
15. Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469, 481 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing the "direct purchaser rule"), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 824 (1995).
16. Id.
17. As discussed below, even this simple example can get a bit more complicated. See
infra Part I.B.
18. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
19. Id. at 494.
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price because of an antitrust violation could recover the full overcharge, regardless of whether the wholesaler was able to pass along
that overcharge by increasing its own prices to retailers. Hanover Shoe
thus deprived defendants of a strategy to eliminate or minimize the
20
damages they owed to a particular plaintiff.

The issue in Illinois Brick was closely related-whether, in turn,
the only plaintiffs permitted to sue for money damages under federal
antitrust law were those victims of an antitrust violation who bought
goods or services directly from the defendants. 21 The Court perceived
only two alternatives: (1) extend HanoverShoe, by allowing only direct
purchasers to recover damages and avoid an analysis of the ripple effects of antitrust violations down the chain of distribution, or (2) reverse Hanover Shoe (or read its holding narrowly) and allow all victims
injured by an antitrust violation to recover damages under the federal
antitrust laws. 2 2 The Court chose to extend the logic of Hanover Shoe.23

It is important for present purposes that in the process the Court set
the federal antiforth the policy aims that determine who may enforce
24
damages.
for
actions
trust laws through private
A.

The Policy Justifications for the Direct Purchaser Rule

According to Illinois Brick, the principal basis for Hanover Shoe was
the Court's perception that it was best to avoid an analysis of the complicated reactions down the chain of distribution in response to an
antitrust violation. 25 As the Court explained, Hanover Shoe sought to
avoid any "attempt to trace the complex economic adjustments to a
change in the cost of a particular factor of production." 26 In Hanover
Shoe, this meant allowing direct purchasers to recover the full overcharge from an antitrust violation. 27 Illinois Brick called for limiting
recovery to direct purchasers only.28 By allowing direct purchasers to

recover the full overcharge, and by permitting only direct purchasers
20. See Loeb, 306 F.3d at 483 (describing Hanover Shoe as a benefit to plaintiffs, balanced by the benefit to defendants of Illinois Brick).
21. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726.
22. Id. at 728-29, 736.
23. Id. at 729.
24. Id. at 731-36 (discussing policy aims).
25. Id. at 731-32 & n.12.
26.
27.

Id. at 732.
See id. at 724-25.

28.

Id. at 729.
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to pursue money damages, the Court rendered the indirect effects of
29
an antitrust violation irrelevant under federal antitrust law.
According to the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick, interpreting
HanoverShoe, the primary policy concerns behind the direct purchaser
rule may be summarized as certainty, efficiency, and effective enforce0
ment.A
The Court concluded that the application of economic theory

to the practical realities of price and output decisions along the chain
of distribution would result in an uncertain, complicated, and difficult
analysis. 3 1 The result would be to impose costs on the judicial system
and to extend already protracted litigation. 32 The direct purchaser
33
rule prevented these difficulties.
The Court also addressed its "longstanding policy of encouraging
vigorous private enforcement of the antitrust laws," 34 which serves the
related aims of deterring antitrust violations and depriving antitrust
violators of their "ill-gotten gains." s ' In this regard, the Court expected the direct purchaser rule to produce mixed results. On the
one hand, allowing direct purchasers to recover "the full amount of
the overcharge"3 6 would provide them with a greater incentive to sue
than would a division of damages among a larger group. The Court
explained that "the antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by
concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers rather than by allowing every plaintiff potentially affected by
the overcharge to sue only for the amount it could show was absorbed
by it."' 3 7 Fewer plaintiffs with more at stake would be more likely to sue

than a larger number of plaintiffs with less at stake.
On the other hand, the Court acknowledged-and lamentedthe possibility that some direct purchasers might be reluctant to sue.
They might be apprehensive about the response from the alleged
wrongdoers. The Court "recognize [d] that direct purchasers sometimes may refrain from bringing a treble-damages suit for fear of dis38
rupting relations with their suppliers."
29. Id.
30. Id. at 731-32.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 732.
34. Id. at 745 (citing Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139
(1968)).
35. Id. at 732 n.12.
36. Id. at 724.
37. Id. at 735.
38. Id. at 746 (citing In reW. Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191,198 (9th Cir. 1973);
Wheeler, supra note 7, at 1325).
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The Court thus placed various policy goals above the aim of solely
compensating each victim of an antitrust violation only to the extent
of its injuries. 39 The direct purchaser rule can further this traditional
aim of damages, but it does not do so exclusively. 40 Consequently, the
rule can produce counterintuitive results. Direct purchasers-entities,
for example, that bought goods directly from the alleged wrongdoers
and then resold them-in receiving damages based on the full
amount of the overcharge, may recover more than is needed to restore them to their position "but for" the wrong. They may have incurred little or no net economic harm from an antitrust violation if
they passed along increased prices to their customers. Yet, they may
recover substantial damages under federal antitrust law. In contrast,
indirect purchasers-entities that bought goods further down the
chain of distribution-may not receive compensation, although they
4
may have borne the brunt of the harm from an antitrust violation. '
In sum, Illinois Brick was explicit about the competing policy concerns relevant to the Court's decision. The result was an imperfect but
practical compromise, one that the Court felt was consistently "on bal42
ance" with the legislative intent behind the federal antitrust laws.
39.

Id. at 734-35.

40.

See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 15 (3d ed. 2002) ("[T]he

fundamental principle of damages is to restore the injured party as nearly as possible to the
position he would have been in but for the wrong.").
41. See Kansas v. UtiliCorp United Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 211-12 (1990) (citations omitted) ("Our decisions in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick often deny relief to consumers who
have paid inflated prices because of their status as indirect purchasers.").
The Court in Hanover Shoe suggested that there "might" be an exception to the direct
purchaser rule for a "pre-existing 'cost-plus' contract." HanoverShoe, 392 U.S. at 494 (internal citation omitted); see also Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 724 n.2, 732 n.12, 736. In Illinois Brick,
the Court later explained, "In such a situation, the purchaser is insulated from any decrease in its sales ... because its customer is committed to buying a fixed quantity regardless of price." Id. at 736. The Supreme Court has since read this exception very narrowly.
The Supreme Court in UtiliCorpsaid it "might" permit an exception to HanoverShoe where
it is "easy to prove" that a direct purchaser resells under a "pre-existing cost-plus contract"
obligating a customer to buy a "fixed quantity regardless of price" so that the effect of an
illegal overcharge "is essentially determined in advance." UtiliCorp,497 U.S. at 217-18; see
McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 855 (3d Cir.1996) ("The vitality of the 'preexisting cost-plus contract' exception is doubtful, however, in light of UtiliCorp."); City of
Philadelphia v. Pub. Employees Benefit Serv. Corp., 842 F. Supp. 827, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(stating the cost-plus exception "to the extent it ever existed, today is so eviscerated that it is
virtually non-existent") (emphasis in original). The Eleventh Circuit in Valley Drugrecognized that there is "a distinction" between the percentage markup contracts used in the
pharmaceutical industry, and the "cost-plus" exception discussed in HanoverShoe. 350 F.3d
at 1190 n.18; see Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735-36 (stating that percentage markup contracts
do not qualify under the "cost-plus" exception).
42. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 745-46.
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Challenges in Applying the Direct Purchaser Rule

The Supreme Court recognized that the "direct purchaser rule"
is imperfect in that some direct purchasers may be reluctant to sue,
43
which could result in inadequate enforcement of the antitrust laws.
Moreover, the direct purchaser rule is somewhat counterintuitive.
Courts may balk at awarding large damages to direct purchasers if
they appear to have been able to pass on some or all of an overcharge,
and therefore where it may appear that they may not have suffered a
loss in profits. Courts may sense that compensation should flow instead to indirect purchasers, who may have suffered significant losses.
Not easily put aside is the ingrained judicial sense, supported by doctrine in most areas of the law, that plaintiffs should recover only those
compensatory damages sufficient to restore them to the position they
44
would have occupied but for the defendants' wrongful acts.
This impediment to applying the direct purchaser rule can produce unfortunate results. When its application is not obvious, courts
may seek guidance from the traditional rule that injured parties may
generally recover damages and that they may do so in proportion to
their injuries. 45 This approach is likely to produce inconsistency and
confusion. Courts would do better to rely on the original policy aims
46
that the Supreme Court set forth in Illinois Brick.
An example is useful in demonstrating how the direct purchaser
rule works in practice, and the challenges to which it can give rise.
Imagine litigation over whether a brand-name prescription drug manufacturer violated federal antitrust laws by delaying entry of a generic
drug onto the market, as occurred in Valley Drug.47 In a simple world,
identifying the direct purchasers and the amount of the overcharge
would be straightforward. Assume, for example, that a drug wholesaler bought one hundred units from the brand-name prescription
drug manufacturer at $5 per unit. The wholesaler then sold the drugs
to a retailer at $6 per unit. Further assume that had the generic drug
entered the market, the wholesaler would have purchased fifty units of
43. Id. at 746.
44. See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 40, at 15.
45. Id.
46. Many scholars have championed this understanding of the task of the judge as
interpreting the law in a manner consistent with its underlying purposes. Perhaps most
notable are Lon Fuller and Ronald Dworkin. See, e.g., Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to
Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HI-Itv. L. REv. 630 (1958) & RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE (1986). For a discussion of the intellectual history of this idea in American jurisprudence, see generally NEIL DUXBURY, PATRNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 227-32 (1995).
47. 350 F.3d at 1183-84.
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the brand-name prescription drug at $4 per unit (assuming the brand
price would have decreased as a result of competition from the generic drug) 48 and fifty units of the generic drug at $2 per unit. The
wholesaler then would have sold the drugs to the retailer at $5 and $3
per unit, respectively.
Applying Illinois Brick in these circumstances is relatively straightforward. The wholesaler is the direct purchaser. It bought the brandname drugs directly from the manufacturer. The retailer, in contrast,
is an indirect purchaser and, as a result, cannot recover any damages
under federal antitrust law because of Illinois Brick. Moreover, the
overcharge paid by the wholesaler is easy to calculate. It is the product
49
of the number of units and the difference in price.
A problem arises, however, if the channels of distribution for the
brand-name and generic prescription drugs are not the same. Assume, for example, that brand-name prescription drugs tend to be
48. We assume that the brand price will decrease in response to generic competition
for purposes of simplicity. We recognize that some researchers suggest that brand price
may remain stable or even increase when a generic drug enters the market.
49. More precisely, the overcharge is the sum of: (1) the difference in the price of the
brand-name drug actually purchased and the price of the brand-name drug if the alleged
antitrust violation had not occurred "($5 - $4 = $1), multiplied by the number of units of
the brand-name drug the wholesaler would have purchased without the antitrust violation
(fifty units); and (2) the difference in price of the brand-name drug actually purchased
and the price at which the wholesaler would have purchased the generic drug ($5 - $2 =
$3), multiplied by the amount of the generic that the wholesaler would have purchased
(fifty
units). The total overcharge, then, is $50 + $150 = $200. Although the simplified
example does not raise the issue, the prices for generic drugs often decrease over time,
which would affect the amount of the overcharge.
The defendants in Valley Drugchallenged this approach. They argued that lost profits,
not the overcharge measure of recovery, is appropriate where the product they sold, a
brand-name drug, would have been replaced with an "economically different" product,
the generic drug. See 350 F.3d at 1186-87. The trial court rejected this argument. In re
Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 203 F.R.D. 551, 557 & n.9 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (citing
2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAw I 394b, at 529 (1998)). The contrary position
would require precisely the kind of complicated analysis of damages foreclosed by Illinois
Brick. Indeed, courts have allowed a party to recover as an overcharge the difference between a brand-name drug and the substitute generic drug. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust
Litig., 200 F.R.D. 297, 309-14 (E.D. Mich. 2001); In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D.
337, 344 (D. Mass. 2003); see also In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d
1144 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Bessemer and Lake Erie R.R. Co. v. WheelingPittsburgh Corp., 510 U.S. 1091 (1994) (recognizing that a direct purchaser prevented
from purchasing a different, but a cheaper substitute as a result of an antitrust violation
may seek to recover the difference in price as an overcharge); Lee-Moore Oil v. Union Oil,
599 F.2d 1299, 1306 (4th Cir. 1979) (same). See generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
PROVING ANTITRUST DAMAGES: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 193-94 (1996) (discussing
same issue) (citing Lower Lake Erie). The Eleventh Circuit did not address this issue explicitly on appeal because it vacated and remanded on other grounds. See Valley Drug, 350 F.3d
at 1187.
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distributed only through wholesalers, but that generic drugs at times
are distributed directly from the generic drug manufacturer to the
retailer, as the Eleventh Circuit in Valley Drug suggested at times occurs. 50 This situation gives rise to what one might call a "bypass" issue,

which can create difficulties for the Illinois Brick analysis.
A simplified illustration is again useful. Imagine a variation on
the scenario offered above involving a brand-name prescription drug
manufacturer that uses illegal means to delay entry of a generic drug.
Recall that the wholesaler bought 100 units of the brand-name prescription drug at $5 per unit. Assume that without the delay, the
wholesaler would have bought fifty units of the brand-name drug at $4
per unit from the brand-name prescription drug manufacturer, which
it would have sold to the retailer. 51 In addition, without the delay, the
retailer would have bought fifty units of the generic drug directly from
the generic drug manufacturer at $2 per unit (and fifty units of the
brand-name drug through the wholesaler).52
These new circumstances may render application of the direct
purchaser rule problematic. Surely, the wholesaler is the direct purchaser for the fifty units it bought from the brand-name drug manufacturer at $5 per unit and which it would have bought at $4 per unit
but for the antitrust violation. Accordingly, the wholesaler is entitled
to recover as an overcharge the difference between the brand price it
actually paid ($5) and the brand price it would have paid ($4) multiplied by the number of units of brand-name drug it would have
bought in a competitive market (fifty units).
The other fifty units, however, are a bit trickier. Because of the
antitrust violation the wholesaler in fact bought the additional fifty
units of the brand-name drug directly from the brand-name drug
manufacturer. For this reason, the wholesaler might be the direct purchaser for those units as well. On the other hand, if not for the antitrust violation, the retailer would have bought fifty units of the generic
drug directly from the generic drug manufacturer, instead of buying
those fifty units of the brand-name drug indirectly through the wholesaler. For this reason, the retailer could be treated as the direct pur53
chaser for purposes of Illinois Brick.
50. 350 F.3d at 1191.
51. That is, the wholesaler's purchases would have decreased from one hundred units
to fifty units.
52. This issue has arisen in the litigation in Valley Drug. See 350 F.3c at 1191.
53. Similar difficulties beset the effort to determine the amount of the overcharge. If
the wholesaler is the direct purchaser, the amount for each unit would seem to be the
difference in the price it paid for the brand-name drug ($5 per unit) and the amount the
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While the right approach to this issue is not obvious, a few points
about its resolution are. First, either the wholesaler or the retailer, but
not both, should be able to recover the overcharge on the fifty units at
issue. Defendants should not face liability for the same sale to two
different plaintiffs under the federal antitrust laws. 5 4 The Supreme

Court has sought to avoid duplicate liability under federal antitrust
laws.

55

Second, defendants should not be able to avoid all liability on any
part of their sales. 56 As the Supreme Court explained long ago in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 57 "The constant tendency of the courts
is to find some way in which damages can be awarded where a wrong
58
has been done."

Third, relying on the policy aims of Illinois Brick is likely to provide useful guidance, 59 but the same is not true for recourse to the
principle that the injured plaintiff should be made whole. Both the
wholesaler and the retailer suffered a real injury from the alleged antitrust violation. But, neither suffered the full harm from the antitrust
violation. In these circumstances, the traditional rule that all injured
persons should recover and should do so sufficiently to be made
whole 60 will not help in choosing the best candidate to recover as a
direct purchaser. On the other hand, a court can resolve the issue by
seeking to promote the policies that animate IllinoisBrick: choosing an
injured party that will allow for certainty, simplicity, and efficiency in
6
enforcing the antitrust laws. '

retailer in these circumstances would have paid for the generic drug ($2 per unit), at least
for the additional fifty additional units that the wholesaler bought as a result of the delay. If
the retailer is the direct purchaser, the overcharge might be that same amount or, alternatively, it could be the difference between the amount the retailer paid for the brand-name
prescription drug ($6 per unit) and the amount it would have paid for the generic drug
($2 per unit). Other variations are possible.
54. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 730.
55. See, e.g., Blue Shield ofVa. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1982); Loeb Indus.,
Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469, 489-90 (7th Cir. 2002).
56. This view is reflected in the Supreme Court's view of the importance, if not the
primacy, of preventing defendants from keeping their ill-gotten gains. Illinois Brick, 431
U.S. at 725-26; see also Loeb, 306 F.3d at 484 (holding direct purchaser rule "never operates
entirely to preclude market recovery for an [antitrust] injury").
57. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
58. Id. at 265.
59. A cogent analysis of the issue of selecting a direct purchaser in a complicated
setting is found in Loeb, 306 F.3d at 483.
60. See, e.g., LAYcOCK, supra note 40, at 15.
61. Loeb, 306 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2002), took an approach along these lines. Loeb involved alleged price-fixing in the market for copper futures. Id. at 474. The conduct at
issue affected the price for copper in various stages of production, including copper cath-
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These important points can easily get lost in the complexities of
antitrust litigation. Courts may flounder in particular because the direct purchaser rule can be counterintuitive. The best understanding
of the direct purchaser rule requires putting aside the familiar concept of simply making a plaintiff whole and instead paying careful attention to the policy concerns of the Supreme Court.
Courts may not always find their way past this difficulty. Indeed,
this challenge may account for the Eleventh Circuit's unprecedented
class certification decision in Valley Drug.6 2 Before addressing that
opinion, however, some background is necessary on class certification,
focusing in particular on its potentially salutary effects in antitrust litigation and on the requirements for a court to certify litigation for
class treatment.

ode, copper rod, and copper scrap. Id. The Seventh Circuit had to decide which, if any, of
the purchasers along the chain of production could sue for damages under federal antitrust law. Id. In Loeb, the Seventh Circuit held that whichever victims of an antitrust violation are deemed to be direct purchasers for purposes of Illinois Brick, the general rule is
that a defendant should be liable for the full measure of the harm it caused. The court
explained:
[The Supreme Court's decisions in] Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick, and McCready
make plain that the antitrust laws create a system that, to the extent possible,
permits recovery in rough proportion to the actual harm a defendant's unlawful
conduct causes in the market without complex damage apportionment. This
scheme at times favors plaintiffs (Hanover Shoe) and at times defendants (Illinois
Brick), but it never operates entirely to preclude market recovery for an injury.
Id. at 483.
The Seventh Circuit recognized that in the case before it more than one plaintiff had
a plausible claim to be a direct purchaser and that no one candidate was ideal. At the same
time, it gave full consideration to the problem of duplicate recovery. The court concluded:
[TJ he solution to this problem, however, is not to deny a right to recover to everyone. Such a draconian rule would give a green light to antitrust scofflaws to conspire to fix prices in a particular market and would create incentives to engage in
antitrust conspiracies in markets with complex distribution structures. Instead,
the proper course is to recognize only the best of the several potential plaintiffs
who otherwise satisfy the requirements for bringing suit under the antitrust laws.
Id. at 490. The Seventh Circuit ensured enforcement of the antitrust laws by selecting
among the potential direct purchasers by recourse to the primary policy considerations
that animated Illinois Brick. certainty, simplicity, and efficiency. Id. at 489-92.
62. Of course, it is also possible that the court was resistant to allowing direct purchasers who allegedly profited from the alleged antitrust violation to recover under the antitrust laws or, for that matter, that the court was simply hostile to class actions. There is no
way to know with certainty.
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A.

Class Certification in Federal Antitrust Cases
The Synergy Between Class Certification and the Direct
Purchaser Rule

The class action device can complement the direct purchaser
rule. This is so both because certification of a class serves many of the
policies identified in Illinois Brick and because proceeding as a class
action can solve some of the difficulties created by that decision.
Class certification, much like the direct purchaser rule, can reduce the cost and unpredictability of litigation. In a class action, a few

named plaintiffs retain counsel to represent a larger group of similarly
situated individuals. 63 The named plaintiffs endure the tribulations of

litigation on behalf of the class. 64 Their counsel ordinarily assume the
financial risks: the lawyers receive compensation for their time and
recover litigation costs when, and only if, they secure a recovery for
65

the class.
The most obvious benefits of class certification in appropriate
cases are efficiency, 66 simplicity, and certainty. 6 7 Once a class is certified, a court can rule on common issues once for all class members. 68
Without class certification, courts would have to revisit the same issues
time and again for different plaintiffs. 69 That sort of duplication
would waste not only judicial resources, but also the time and money
63. See 1 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 3, § 1:1, at 2 & § 3:2 at 215 (4th ed. 2002)
(citing Reimer v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561
F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978)).
64. Id.
65. 4 NEWBERG & CON-rE, supra note 3, § 14:2, at 512. See generally Charles Silver, A
Restitutionary Theory of Attorney's Fees in Class Actions, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 656 (1991).
66. 1 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 3, § 1:1, at 3 & 1:5, at 25 (citing Am. Pipeline &
Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974); Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S.
147, 159 (1982)).
67. Silver, supra note 65, at 675 n.106 ("Class actions can also be used to ... reduce
the risk of inconsistent verdicts and obligations and to achieve distributive fairness among
victims in cases where defendants possess limited funds.").
68. See 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1780, at 564-65 n.5 (citing Klamberg v.
Roth, 473 F. Supp. 544 (D.N.Y. 1979) (finding that individuals had claims substantial
enough to bring individual actions did not outweigh the benefit of having defendant's
liability determined in one proceeding justified class certification); Technograph Printed
Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., Inc., 285 F. Supp 714, 724 (N.D. Ill. 1968)).
69. 2 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 3, §5.46, at 464 nn.5-6 (citing In re Gen. Motors
Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 783 (3d Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 824 (1995), on remand to In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 961 1996 WL 683785 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 1996), affd, 134 F.3d
133 (3d Cir. 1998); Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F. 3d 742, 758 n.5 (4th Cir.
1998), cert. granted,judgment vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999); Gen. Tel. Co. of
the Southwest, 457 U.S. 147; Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F. 3d 402, 414 (5th Cir.
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unsure as to
of the parties. 70 It would also leave individual 7litigants
1
how the court will rule in their particular case.
Class certification can also ensure that injured victims are able to
pursue their legal rights. 72 Courts have long recognized that when a

wrongdoer imposes small injuries on a large number of victims, class
certification may be the only viable means to pursue vindication
73
through litigation.
Less often recognized is that class certification may enable direct
purchasers who are apprehensive about suing individually to assert
their legal rights. Recall that the Supreme Court recognized that some
direct purchasers might be reluctant to sue their suppliers for fear of
disrupting an economic relationship.74 Class certification can solve
this problem. 75 A few named plaintiffs face the ire of the entities that
1998); Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. INS, 182 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999), reh'g en banc
granted, 197 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), and on reh'gen banc, 232 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2000)).
70. 2 NEWBERG & CONrE, supra note 3, § 5:3, at 422 (citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.
of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972) ("[C]lass actions... may enhance the efficacy of private
actions by permitting citizens to combine their limited resources to achieve a more powerful litigation posture.")); see also id. § 5:46, at 464 (citing FED. R. Cxv. P. 23 advisory committee's note) ("Subdivision (b) (3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would
achieve economies of time, effort, and expense and promote uniformity of decision ...
without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.")).
71. Id. at 466 ("The end result [in class actions] affords increased legal certainties for
all litigants, class plaintiffs and defendants alike."); Transamerican Refining Corp. v. Dravo
Corp., 130 F.R.D 70, 76 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (certification would promote uniformity and
economy in cases, therefore problem of manageability did not justify denial of class
certification).
72. 4 NEWBERG & CorTE, supra note 3, § 14.6, at 571 n.61 (citing Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) ("Class actions also may permit the plaintiffs to pool
claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually ...this lawsuit involves claims
averaging about $100 per plaintiff; most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in
court if a class action were not available.")).
73. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997). The Court stated:
"The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the
problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to
bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem
by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth
someone's (usually an attorney's) labor."
Id. (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also 6
NEWBERG & CON-E, supra note 3, § 18:1 (citing Coleman v. Cannon Oil Co., 141 F.R.D.
516, 520 (M.D. Ala. 1992)). Nothing in Rule 23, however, prohibits certifying a class comprised of both large and small claimants. See Paper Sys., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 193 F.R.D.
601, 605 (E.D. Wis. 2001) ("[T]he presence of large claimants in a proposed antitrust class
and the possibility that some of them might proceed on their own does not militate against
class certification.").
74. Illinois Brick Co. v Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977).
75. See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 297, 325 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
(certifying class of direct purchasers of brand-name prescription drug alleging overcharges
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allegedly violated the antitrust laws. They initiate and pursue the litigation. The absent class members can remain bystanders for most, if
not all, of the adversarial proceedings. 7 6 Ordinarily, all they need to
do to benefit from the litigation is to refrain from opting out of the
class after they receive notice that it has been certified. 77 Once the
case is resolved, either through settlement or trial, the absent class
members need only submit claims to enjoy the fruits of the class litigation. This arrangement promotes key policies from Illinois Brick: by
encouraging widespread participation in antitrust litigation among injured parties, wrongdoers are unable to retain their ill-gotten gains
and therefore lose incentive to violate the antitrust laws in the first
place.
B.

The Requirements for Class Certification of Antitrust Litigation

Class certification may well complement the direct purchaser
rule, but that does not mean it is appropriate in every case. For a court
to certify litigation for class treatment, the plaintiffs must show that
the case meets the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(a) 78 and one of the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b), 79 which, in cases involving damages, ordinarily is Rule
23(b) (3).80
arising from delayed generic competition, including class members with potentially large
claims and stating that "[it is not] obvious that all members of the class would be willing to
independently sue their suppliers"), leave to appeal under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) denied, 332
F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
76. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 552 (1974) (absent class members
are passive members to the litigation and need not take any active steps to protect their
interests); DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS
FOR PRIVATE GAIN, 14-15 (Rand 2000) ("If an [absent] plaintiff remains silent, then he is

deemed to have chosen to be a member of the class, and the outcome of the class action
(whether in favor of plaintiffs or defendants) is binding on him."). Id. ("Absent parties'
rights, under the rule, are protected by ensuring that the plaintiffs who bring the class
action are truly representative of those who are absent-a responsibility given to the judge,
who must agree that the plaintiffs who have come forward may act on behalf of the class");
1 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 3, § 1:3, at 17.
77. Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Abbott Labs., Inc. v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 290 F.3d 854, 859 (7th Cir. 2002); Sperling v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 24 F.3d
463, 470 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Members of a Rule 23(b) (3) class are automatically included...
unless they make a timely election to opt-out."); HENSLER ET AL., supra note 76, at 74-75.
78. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b) provides, "An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied." See also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591 (1996); Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 151 n.3
(1982); Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D. 519, 533 (S.D.N.Y 1972).
79. Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 615-18.
80. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 76, at 13-15 ("[The revised Rule 23(b)(3) allows for
class certification] when, as a practical matter, it would be more efficient for litigants with
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Rule 23(a) requires that the members of the proposed class be
numerous,8 1 that the claims of the class members involve common
issues of fact or law,8 2 and that the named plaintiffs have claims typical
of the class as a whole8 3 and will represent the class adequately.8 4 Rule
23(b) (3) further requires that issues common to the class
85
predominate over issues affecting only individual class members. It
is quite common for antitrust cases to satisfy these requirements, particularly if they are based on illegal conduct that affects the market as
86
a whole.
The focus of Valley Drugwas whether the named plaintiffs could
represent the class adequately. In particular, the court addressed
whether their interests were in sufficient tension with those of some of
the absent class members such that class certification would be inappropriate. 87 Courts will generally find the named plaintiffs in a proposed class action to be inadequate representatives of the class only if
a "fundamental" conflict exists between them and the absent class
similar interests (usually in securing money damages) to proceed collectively, led by representative parties.").
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1). There is no minimum "magic" number that is required to
satisfy the numerosity requirement, but numerosity is generally found where the proposed
class has forty members, and fewer will suffice. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220,
226 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting forty class members are generally sufficient to satisfy numerosity); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 463 (E.D. Pa. 1968)
(holding twenty-five members are sufficient to satisfy numerosity).
82. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a) (2). For an example of the commonality requirement, see In
re Potash Antitrust Litigation, 159 F.R.D. 682 (D. Minn. 1995), in which the court held that
the common question requirement was satisfied because putative class members had a
common interest in proof of a concerted action, conspiracy, and of agreement with the
goal to fix prices of wholesale potash.
83. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a) (3). For an example of the typicality requirement, see In re
Domestic Air TransportationAntitrust Litigation, 137 F.R.D 677 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4). For application of the adequacy requirement, see In re
Potash, 159 F.R.D. at 692-93 (named plaintiffs adequate although interests not perfectly
aligned).
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (3) requires that "the court finds that the questions of law or
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members." Hoxworth v.Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 924 (3d Cir.
1992); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283,
315 (3d Cir. 1998); In reVisa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 138-40
(2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 917 (2002).
86. See, e.g., In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 202 F.R.D. 12, 21-22
(D.D.C. 2001); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 209 F.R.D. 251, 262-63 (D.D.C. 2002); In re
Infant Formula Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 878, 1992 WL 503465, at *6 (N.D. Fla. 1992); In
re Bromine Antitrust Litig., 203 F.R.D. 403, 413-14 (S.D. Ind. 2001); In re Catfish Antitrust
Litig., 826 F. Supp. 1019, 1039 (N.D. Miss. 1993); In re Wirebound Boxes Antitrust Litig.,
128 F.R.D. 268, 271-72.
87. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., 350 F.3d 1181, 1187 (lth Cir. 2003).
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members. 88 The Eleventh Circuit in Valley Drug explained that "the
existence of minor conflicts alone will not defeat a party's claim to
be a 'fundamental' one going to
class certification: the conflict must
89
the specific issues in controversy.

M.

The Eleventh Circuit's Opinion in Valley Drug

With an understanding of the formal requirements and policy
considerations behind Illinois Brick, a grasp of the "bypass" issue, and
the standard for adequate representation under 23(a) (4), it is possible to assess the Eleventh Circuit's decision regarding class certification in Valley Drug.
A.

The Background of Valley Drug

Valley Drug arose from agreements between the manufacturer of
a brand-name prescription drug and two potential generic competitors. These agreements provided that the competitors would refrain
from marketing their competing, generic products during the pendency of patent litigation in return for multi-million dollar payments. 90 In particular, Abbott Laboratories, maker of the brand-name
drug Hytrin, agreed to pay Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Zenith
Goldline Pharmaceuticals-both generic drug companies. In return,
the generic drug companies agreed to refrain from marketing generic
versions of Hytrin, all of which have the same active ingredient, ter88. Id. at 1189; see also Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 430-31(4th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2837 (2004) ("To defeat the adequacy requirement of
Rule 23, a conflict 'must be more than merely speculative or hypothetical,' but rather, it
must be fundamental. It must go to the heart of the litigation.") (internal citations
omitted).
89. Valley Drug,350 F.3d at 1189 (citing 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1768, at
326-27; 1 NEWBERG & CONa, supra note 3, § 3.26, at 3-143 to -155).
90. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1295-1301 (11th Cir.
2003) (discussing background of the litigation). The Federal Trade Commission has investigated a number of similar agreements involving delayed generic entry. See FTC, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY

ch.3, at 12 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf ("The Commission has pursued numerous antitrust enforcement actions affecting both brand-name and generic drug manufacturers when it had reason to believe that a company abused its patent rights in violation
of the antitrust laws."); id. at 12-13 nn.58-66 (identifying FTC enforcement actions and
consent decrees, including the one at issue- in Valley Drug, between Abbott Laboratories,
maker of the brand-name drug Hytrin, and Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a generic drug
company); Consent Order, In re Abbott Labs., (FTC May 22, 2000) (No. C-3945), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/c3945.do.htm) (last accessed Sept. 27, 2004).
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azosin hydrochloride ("terazosin").91 Abbott's payment to Zenith was
$3 million up front, followed by potential incremental payments of $3
million to $6 million every three months during the delay.9 2 Abbott
also agreed to pay Geneva $4.5 million per month pending litigation
over Abbott's patent rights, subject to certain conditions. 93 The plaintiffs in Valley Drug filed a lawsuit claiming that these agreements violated federal antitrust laws.
The trial court in Valley Drug certified a class of all direct purchasers of Hytrin from Abbott. 94 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated
and remanded based on its concern that a "fundamental conflict" potentially existed between the class representatives and some of the absent class members. 95 In particular, the court was worried about a
possible conflict between the named plaintffs and the three largest
pharmaceutical wholesalers in the United States, 9 6 which the court believed might have derived a net gain from the allegedly illegal conduct.97 The reasons for this potential net benefit were threefold:
(1) A Set Percentage Mark-Up. According to the defendants, the
three largest national wholesalers allegedly charge the same percentage mark-up from their acquisition cost on branded and generic
drugs. As a result, higher prices for brand-name drugs than generic
drugs would allegedly generate higher profits for the national
98
wholesalers.
(2) Inelastic Demand. The defendants argued that terazosin is used
for severe conditions, leaving patients little alternative but to buy the
drug. According to this theory, sales are not responsive to price fluctuations. If this is right, a drop in price allegedly would not result in an
increase in sales volume, which might otherwise compensate for any
decreased profits of the national wholesalers on individual sales. 99
(3) Bypass. Another possibility the Eleventh Circuit considered
was that the generic drug manufacturers, unlike brand-name drug
91. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1300.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1300-01.
94. The class was defined as "all entities who purchased Hytrin, also known by the
chemical name terazosin hydrochloride, directly from Abbott at any time during the period commencing March 31, 1998, through August 13, 1999." In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 203 F.R.D. 551, 560-61 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (amending prior class
definition sua sponte).
95. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 2003).
96. Id. at 1189-90.
97. Id. at 1190-91.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1191.
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manufacturers, might bypass wholesalers and sell some of their product directly to retailers. The agreements to delay entry of the generic
drugs might therefore preserve sales of the branded drug that the
large wholesalers would lose once generic drugs became available. 10 0
The Eleventh Circuit noted that none of the national wholesalers
chose to be a named plaintiff in the action and that some of them
assigned a portion of their interest in the litigation to third parties. 10 1
It drew the inference that the interests of the national wholesalers
might not be promoted by the litigation. 102 The appellate court acknowledged that the record before it was insufficient to assess whether
some class members experienced a net gain and others a net loss from
the alleged antitrust violations. 0 3 It therefore authorized discovery,
including so-called "downstream" discovery, which the court did not
define but which generally refers to discovery further down the chain
10 4
of distribution, such as that of a direct purchaser's own sales.
B.

Intuition Collides with an illinois Brick Wall

To assess the Eleventh Circuit's decision, it is important first to try
to make sense of it. This is difficult, however, because the court never
described the precise potential conflict of interest that gave rise to its
concern. The court emphasized the need to assess "the economic reality of the situation" to determine if "some class members . . . have

economic interests that are significantly different from-and potentially antagonistic to-the named representatives purporting to represent them." 105 However, the court never explained the interests of
the class members that might be at odds. True, the court repeatedly
noted that some class members might have experienced a net benefit
from the conduct at issue and others a net loss. 10 6 But that claim pro100. Id.
101. Id. at 1193.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1191-92. In fact, pharmaceutical industry analysts have noted that generic
competition generates a number of benefits for the three national wholesalers, including
(1) increased margins; (2) increased leverage to negotiate better purchase prices and
greater rebates; (3) lower capital and inventory costs; (4) improved liquidity; (5) additional
means of earning profits; and (6) better return on committed capital. See FITCH RATINGS,
THE GENERIC EQUATION: THE EMERGENCE OF GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS AND THEIR IMPACT

2-4 (Oct. 14, 2003) (analyzing businesses of the national wholesalers);J.P. MORGAN, 2003 DISTRIBUTION OUTLOOK 16-22 (Apr. 21, 2003) (analyst report).
104. Valley Drug, 350 F.3d at 1192. The court noted that the district court, on remand,
"retained discretion" to decide "how much discovery is enough." Id. at 1195.
105. Id. at 1195 (footnote omitted).
106. Id. at 1188, 1190-91.
ON PHARMACEUTICAL WHOLESALERS

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

vides only a description of potential characteristics of class members.
It does not purport to explain how their interests might conflict with
the named representative in connection with the litigation. At no
point did the court identify any goals of the national wholesalers in
the litigation that might be different from the goal of the class representatives. It never said that any class members would like to achieve a
specific objective that others would like to prevent. It never said
whether or how any absent class members would be harmed if the
named representatives succeeded in proving defendants' liability.
The court did suggest that the national wholesalers may have
been content to have the alleged antitrust violation occur. 10 7 Perhaps
the court thought that this might be a sufficient reason to believe that
the national wholesalers would not benefit from the class litigation.
The litigation, however, sought only recovery of the overcharges resulting from the allegedly illegal conduct that had already occurred. After all, by the time the district court certified the class, generic
terazosin had been on the market for more than two years. 10 8 Pursuing claims in litigation would not deprive the national wholesalers of
any profits they allegedly obtained from the delay of the entry of generic drugs onto the market, if that was in fact the effect of the agreements. Moreover, as the Eleventh Circuit noted, under Illinois Brick
the national wholesalers could recover as damages any overcharge
they paid "even if they experienced a net gain." 10 9 Thus, the economic
interests of the national wholesalers would be to receive treble damages from the antitrust litigation, whether or not they suffered a loss
in profits. Just like the named plaintiffs, the national wholesalers
would like the court to conclude an antitrust violation had occurred
and to calculate the resulting overcharge in an amount as large as
possible. What, then, was the "economic reality" that would pit the
interests of the national wholesalers against those of the class
representatives? 10

107. Id. at 1193.
108. See In reTerazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 203 F.R.D. 551, 533 & n.1, 556
(S.D. Fla. 2001) (stating that the generic drug entered the market in August 1999).
109. Valley Drug, 350 F.3d at 1193.
110. Because the requirement is of a "fundamental conflict" that goes to the merits of
the litigation, 6 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 3, § 18:1.7, at 58, an advantage to some class
members over the long-term from an antitrust violation does not prevent class certification
where all class members will benefit from proving an antitrust violation and damages. Id.
§ 18:18, at 62-63 & n.3 (citing In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682 (D. Minn.
1995)).
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The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Valley Drug never answered this
question. It merely returned time and again to the possibility that the
national wholesalers may have benefited from the agreements between Abbott, Geneva, and Zenith, while other class members may
have been harmed.1 1 1 The court then ended with the following cryptic assertion: "In the matter at hand, it would not be difficult to imagine that the national wholesalers, who benefitted from the
defendants' conduct, would have substantially different interests and
objectives than the named representatives purporting to represent
112
them."
The court did not identify what it "imagine [d] ," but it did cite as
a "rule" that "'a class cannot be certified when its members have opposing interests or when it consists of members who benefit from the
same acts alleged to be harmful to other members of the class."' 113
That "rule," however, derived not from antitrust cases, which are subject to the direct purchaser rule, but from cases governed by the general principle that injured plaintiffs may recover only in an amount
needed to make them whole. In such cases, if some class members
obtained a net benefit from the alleged wrongful conduct, they might
have no legal claim for damages at all. As a result, a plaintiff who incurred a net harm from the challenged conduct might not be able to
protect the interests of class members who obtained a net gain,1 1 4 par111. Valley Drug, 350 F.3d at 1188, 1190-91.
112. Id. at 1196 (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 n.13 (1975)).
113. Id. at 1189 (quoting Pickett v. Iowa Beef Processors, 209 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th
Cir. 2000)).
114. Pickett, for example, involved a suit by cattle producers brought under the Packers
and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229 (2004), that alleged that the defendant, a beef
processor, depressed beef prices by locking up supply through forward contracts (whereby
the packer and cattle producer agree *on the price for cattle weeks or months before the
animals are ready for slaughter) and by other means. Pickett, 209 F.3d at 1278. Plaintiffs
alleged that the use of forward contracts injured cattle producers who elected to sell their
cattle on the open or "spot" market, and thereby violated the Packers and Stockyards Act,
which prohibits beef packers from giving "any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person." 7 U.S.C. § 192(b) (2004) (quoted in Pickett, 209 F.3d at
1278). Plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief on behalf of a class of all cattle producers that had sold cattle to the defendant during a defined time period. Pickett, 209 F.3d
at 1277. The district court certified the class-actually, the district court at first denied
certification, see Pickett v. Iowa Beef Processors, 182 F.R.D. 647 (M.D. Ala. 1998), then the
case was reassigned to a different judge, plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the class
certification decision, and the second district judge certified the class. See Pickett, 209 F.3d
at 1278-79 & n.2. However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that defendants' conduct benefited many class members who "willingly entered into forward contracts" and that
the injunction sought by the representative plaintiffs "would impose a significant restriction on the way these producers do business." Id. at 1280-81.
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ticularly if the suit challenges ongoing conduct that benefits some
11 5

class members.

115. In various cases that the Eleventh Circuit cited, using actual harm to measure
damages gave rise to tensions between the recovery different plaintiffs could seek. In Pickett, for example, the original district court, in denying class certification, had noted that
class members who claimed damages "will have to argue that other Plaintiffs received benefits" because the crux of the damage claim was that the defendant had illegally granted
undue advantage to certain class members to the detriment of other class members. Pickett,
182 F.R.D. at 653. Class members who received such benefits, however, would "have no
standing to bring a claim." Id. at 654. In other words, some class members, by pursuing
their legal claim in the litigation, would necessarily tend to injure or even defeat the potential claims of other claims members, because under the substantive law governing the
claims at issue, a plaintiff may recover only for actual damages suffered. At a minimum,
some class members would be seeking to label other class members as having obtained an
unfair and possibly illegal advantage.
The same is true of Auto Ventures, Inc. v. Moran, No. 92-426-Civ, 1997 WL 306895 (S.D.
Fla. 1997), cited by the Eleventh Circuit in both Pickett and Valley Drug. In Auto Ventures, the
car maker Toyota allegedly harmed class members (car dealers) by withholding cars to
punish the dealers for failing to purchase additional, unwanted items and services. Other
class members, however, allegedly were rewarded by Toyota for agreeing to buy the same
items and services. The court found that a conflict existed between these groups of class
members because "[a]s a practical matter, penalized dealers may be forced to argue that
rewarded dealers accumulated benefits, not damages, as a consequence of their more amicable relationship with the Defendants." Id. at *5.In other words, class members who were
deprived of cars would, in the course of trying to prove their legal claim, necessarily tend
to defeat or injure the legal claims of other class members who allegedly were rewarded by
Toyota.
The Eleventh Circuit in Valley Drug also cited In re Healthsouth Corp. Securities Litigation,
213 F.R.D. 447, 462-63 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463 (7th Cir.
1988); Morris v. McCaddin, 553 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1977); and Phillips v. Klassen, 502 F.2d
362 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Again, none of these cases is an antitrust case. In Healthsouth, a securities fraud case, some class members allegedly benefited by defrauding fellow class members. See Healthsouth, 213 F.R.D. at 448. In Bieneman, the named plaintiff repeatedly
attempted to sue over noise at O'Hare airport in Chicago. The plaintiff lost on the merits,
then later attempted to bring a class action on behalf of some 300,000 persons. See
Bieneman, 864 F.2d at 465. The Seventh Circuit, in language quoted in Valley Drug,stated
that "[s]ome of these" 300,000 persons "undoubtedly derive great benefit" from the airport. Id. The Seventh Circuit discussed this issue in dicta, however, in the context of noting
the large number of individual "variables" that may determine the impact of the airport on
a particular class member. Id. A class member who "benefited" from the existing operations at O'Hare might well oppose the representative plaintiff s efforts to effect changes in
those operations. Id. In Morris, eighteen members of the Army National Guard sued over
alleged violations that occurred in reducing the number ofjobs in a missile program. The
plaintiffs were among 291 technicians whose jobs would be eliminated. See Morris, 553 F.2d
at 867-68. The opinion discusses the plaintiffs' motion for class certification in two
sentences. Id. at 870-71. But apparently, the eighteen plaintiffs sought to represent all 291
technicians, even though all proposed class members would be competing for only 115
available positions. Id. at 867. A remedy that would protect the job of one class member
could deprive another of a position. Finally, in Phillips, plaintiffs were former U.S. Post
Office employees who accepted offers to resign with various benefits rather than lose their
jobs in a reduction in force, but who then sued, alleging their retirements were coerced.
See Phillips, 502 F.2d at 363-64. The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of 1,500, and
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Under the direct purchaser rule, however, each direct purchaser
may recover the full amount of the overcharge it paid. It is irrelevant
whether, for example, a direct purchaser may have actually benefited
from higher prices associated with brand-name drugs because its profits were a percentage of its acquisition costs. 1 16 The Eleventh Circuit

never grappled with this aspect of the legal framework for recovery of
damages under Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe.1 17 None of the cases the
Eleventh Circuit cited was an antitrust case brought by direct purchasers. 118 None, therefore, involved the rule that a plaintiffs recovery
does not depend on the actual net harm it suffered. The court's formalistic approach failed to adjust to the very task it placed before itself: assessing the potential conflict in light of the "economic reality of
the situation." 119 The court refused to apply its rule for the potential
conflicts "any differently than [the court] would apply [the rule] in all
other contexts." 120 In sum, by relying on case law that developed in
areas of law unaffected by the direct purchaser rule, the court based
its decision on an approach to damages that simply did not apply.
C.

Applying the Policy Concerns of Illinois Brick to Valley Drug

The Eleventh Circuit should have ruled quite differently in Valley
Drug in light of Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe.121 Under Hanover Shoe,
no discovery would be necessary to determine which class members
requested a ruling that "all the resignations" were unlawful. Id. at 367. The court observed
that some class members undoubtedly desired to resign, and a class ruling finding their
retirements unlawful might subject some class members to affirmative liability to, for example, repay retirement bonuses, obligations "they are not in a financial position to shoulder." Id. In such circumstances, involving individuals and potential affirmative liability, the
potential conflict could not be cured by notice and an opportunity to opt out. Id.
116. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).
117. The court did acknowledge that plaintiffs had relied throughout their briefs in
support of class certification on Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe. See Valley Drug, 350 F.3d. at
1192. Indeed, the court recognized that these cases together meant that all of the class
members-those who may have profited and those who did not-could recover whatever
overcharge they paid. See Id. The court then concluded, however, that this fact did not
eliminate any "fundamental conflict" between the class members. Id. What the court failed
to explain was why, in light of the direct purchaser rule, there was a conflict between the
class members at all. As noted in the text, it simply never identified the objectives of different class members that might have been at odds. See id.
118. See supra notes 114-115.
119. Valley Drug, 350 F.3d at 1195.
120. Id. at 1193 (citing Pickett v. Iowa Beef Processors, 209 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir.
2000)). The Valley Drug court described the Pickett decision as "ruling a class cannot be
certified where some class members benefitted economically from conduct alleged to be
illegal by the named representatives." Id.
121. The Southern District of Ohio in J.B.D.L. Corp. v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., No. C-1-01704, 2003 WL 23844777 (S.D. Ohio May 12, 2003), explained the point succinctly:
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profited from the allegedly illegal conduct and, for those that did, by
how much. That discovery could not yield information about any conflicting objectives among the potential class members, and so would
not be worth pursuing. After all, every class member could recover the
overcharge it paid, whether or not it was able to pass on some or all of
it to downstream purchasers. 122 A review of the policy goals of Illinois
Brick shows that foregoing this unnecessary discovery would have
been the best course.
The primary policy goals that the Supreme Court identified in
Illinois Brick were certainty, efficiency, and effective enforcement. It
was toward these ends that the Supreme Court chose a standard that
would avoid any inquiry into "the complex economic adjustments to a
change in the cost of a particular factor of production."'1 23 According
to the Court, that inquiry was by its nature uncertain, complicated,
and inefficient. 124 Yet that is the path down which the Eleventh Circuit's decision may lead. Valley Drug authorized "downstream discovery,"1 2 5 designed to determine if any direct purchasers profited from
an alleged antitrust violation. That task can be difficult, costly, and,
126
under Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, is ultimately irrelevant.
Wyeth next argues that there is a conflict between the class representatives and
some class members because some class members purchased large quantities of
Premarin and were able to resell it at a greater profit after price increases. This
argument is also without merit. Antitrust injury is considered complete when the
direct purchaser pays an illegal overcharge and whether he was able to pass
through the overcharge to indirect purchasers is irrelevant to the inquiry. Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 489 (1968); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. Of CaZifornia., 405 U.S. 251, 262 n.14 (1972); Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at
724-25. Thus, as long as the price paid by the class members for Premarin was
higher than it would have been absent the alleged anticompetitive conduct, there
is no conflict created if indeed some of the direct purchasers were able to recoup
the overcharge through price increases passed on to other purchasers.
Id.
122. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that it did not disagree with the Tenth Circuit's holding in Sports Racing Services v. Sports Car Club of America, 131 F.3d 874 (10th Cir.
1997), that
"Hanover Shoe precludes the argument that [plaintiff] did not suffer cognizable
antitrust injury merely because it passed overcharges on to its customers or otherwise was shielded from competition by defendants' anticompetitive behavior....
As a direct purchaser, [plaintiff] may sue for and recover the full amount of the
illegal overcharge."
Valley Drug,350 F.3d at 1192 (quoting Sports Racing Servs. v. Sports Car Club of Am., 131
F.3d at 885).
123. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 731-32 (1977).
124. Id.
125. 350 F.3d at 1195-96.
126. See In re Visa Check/Master Money Antitrust Litigation, 192 F.R.D. 68 (E.D.N.Y.
2000), afjfd, 280 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied 536 U.S. 917 (2002), in which the
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Moreover, the court imposed this difficult and costly enterprise
on the absent class members. This is, to put it gently, ironic. In the
name of protecting the absent class members-especially the national
12 7
wholesalers-the court foisted a burden on them.
In contrast, class certification without any downstream discovery
would promote vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws to the benefit of the absent class members. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged
that the national wholesalers could sue, even if they profited from the
conduct at issue in Valley Drug. 28 Illinois Brick reveals that in an ideal
world they would do so. Indeed, the structure that the Supreme Court
created for private enforcement of the antitrust laws was designed to
force defendants to pay treble damages for the overcharge they im129
posed on all of their sales.
Furthermore, the Court's analysis in Illinois Brick belies the Eleventh Circuit's suggestion that the national wholesalers may have chodistrict court rejected the argument that a class seeking antitrust overcharge damages
should not be certified because defendants' alleged conduct created "'winners' and
'losers.'" Id. at 85. The district court stated that "[this argument is immaterial when an
antitrust plaintiff proceeds on an 'overcharge theory' of damages." Id. (emphasis added);
see also In re Buspirone Patent & Antitrust Litig., 210 F.R.D. 43, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting argument that major wholesalers may have benefited from delayed generic entry,
and explaining that to permit the argument would introduce "just the kind of complicated
proceedings.., that the Supreme Court held to be generally inappropriate in the antitrust
context" (citing Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 492-93
(1968)); In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 337, 344 (D. Mass. 2003) (defendant's
arguments "regarding actual economic harm" are "irrelevant" where class seeks overcharge
damages); id. at 343 ("Louisiana Wholesale asserts claims typical of those of the class,
claiming similar injuries, suffered during the same period and arising from the same conduct. As such, the Court conclude[s] that no conflicts presently exist."); In re Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 297, 317 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (rejecting argument that some class
members who incur an overcharge may nevertheless not have suffered antitrust injury because they allegedly obtained a net benefit (citing In re Visa Check, 192 F.R.D. at 85)); id. at
306 (approving Louisiana Wholesale as class representative and rejecting defendants' speculative arguments about potential conflicts).
Some discovery might be appropriate to determine if a purchaser qualified for the
very narrow exception to Illinois Brick for "cost-plus" contracts. See supra note 41. This exception, however, rarely, if ever, applies and so any such discovery should be very limited.
127. Courts have consistently refused to permit downstream discovery in federal antitrust cases governed by HanoverShoe and Illinois Brick. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 198
F.R.D. 296, 301 (D.D.C. 2000) ("no court has ever allowed production of individualized
downstream data"); Go-Tane Serv. Stations, Inc. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 200, 204
n.8 (N.D. I11.
1981); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 250, 1978 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20409, at *9 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 1978) ("Whether purchasers absorbed, passed-on, or
made a profit . . . is irrelevant, and investigations into such matters are proscribed by
Illinois Brick.'); In re Wirebound Boxes Antitrust Litig., 131 F.R.D. 578 (D. Minn. 1990); In
re Polyester Staple Antitrust Litig., No. 3:03CV1516 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 2004).
128. 350 F.3d at 1193-94.
129. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 745-46; Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494.
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sen not to serve as named plaintiffs because their interests were not
served by the litigation. As the Supreme Court noted, a potential hazard of the direct purchaser rule is under-enforcement because some
direct purchasers may be reluctant to bring an action that might "disrupt[ ] relations with their suppliers." 13 0 The national wholesalers may
have hesitated to initiate litigation against the drug manufacturers for
this reason. Class certification can cure this problem by permitting
absent class members to recover overcharges simply by remaining in
the class, thereby promoting the deterrent function of private enforcement of the antitrust laws. Absent class members who do not wish
to participate may opt out. The national wholesalers did not opt out of
the class originally certified in Valley Drug.131 It is implausible to think
that such "sophisticated businesses" 13 2 would fail to remove them133
selves from a class that was harming their interests.
130. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746.
131. See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 223 F.R.D. 666, 679 (S.D. Fla.
2004). Nor did they opt out of several other similar class action suits seeking overcharges
arising from alleged delayed generic competition. Id.
132. 350 F.3d at 1194 n.20.
133. See Larry James Oldsmobile-Pontiac-GMC Truck Co., Inc., 164 F.R.D. 428, 437
(N.D. Miss. 1996) (if "class member genuinely disputes the appropriateness of the suit"
"such a member may utilize the opt-out procedure"); Lockwood Motors, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 162 F.R.D. 569, 578 (D. Minn. 1995) (same); In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159
F.R.D. 682, 692 (D. Minn. 1995) (even if defendants' allegedly anticompetitive conduct
may benefit some class members in the long run, such class members "are free to opt
out"); Uniondale Beer Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 340, 343 (E.D.N.Y.
1987) ("[A]ny class member holding a different position on the benefits of the lawsuit or
believing that its interests conflict with those of the named representatives may 'opt
out.'"); Race Buick Pontiac-Cadillac Oldsmobile-GMC. Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. Civ.
A. No. 94-25-E, 1994 WL 868022, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 1994) ("To the extent that differences of opinion exist between the named plaintiff and some of the members of the putative class the Court is satisfied that the differences can be adequately addressed by the optout procedure."); Fowler v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1055, 1059 (5th Cir. 1979)
("Any antagonistic interests were ameliorated by the provision for notice in the decree,
with an opportunity to opt out of the class."); Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797, 807
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 437 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971) (fact that no class members objected or asked to be excluded from the litigation refuted allegations that the representative plaintiffs were not adequate or that antagonism existed). See generally 7A WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 3, §1768 ("Silence after appropriate notice... may demonstrate that
the members have acquiesced in the party's representation and show a lack of antagonism.
This is especially true if the members have been fully informed that the judgment in the
action will be conclusively binding on them.").
Finally, one might question whether the court would want to protect the interest an
absent class member might have in encouraging a violation of the antitrust laws. The court
addressed this issue in In re Potash, 159 F.R.D. at 690-91, where the defendants were accused of fixing the price of potash, a mineral used to make fertilizer. As in Valley Drug, the
representative plaintiffs were among the smaller purchasers of potash. Id. In arguing that
the representative plaintiffs failed the adequacy requirement of Rule 23(a)(4), defendants
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Permitting direct purchasers who allegedly profited from an antitrust violation to recover alongside, and from the efforts of, direct purchasers who suffered a net loss, may, in a sense, entail a windfall that
the law rarely permits. But allowing that "windfall" was the fundamental result of the decision of the Supreme Court in Illinois Brick.134 Including all direct purchasers in a single class may, like politics, make
for strange bedfellows, but it does not create a conflict among class
members seeking damages.
D.

A Court at War with Itself-Valley Drug on Remand

The Eleventh Circuit's decision left the trial court with a struggle
of jurisprudential proportions. Long ago Lon Fuller suggested that
incoherence may be one of the defects of interpreting law other than
in furtherance of the purposes it serves. 135 0On remand, the trial court

was forced to confront this possibility as it was asked to implement a
ruling that it seemed to recognize did not make sense. The result is an
opinion that at first appears to concede that class certification is appropriate, but then denies class certification because the plaintiffs allegedly failed to make a showing that they never should have been
required to make.
To be more concrete, the trial court saw itself as charged with
pursuing two irreconcilable tasks on remand: first, to find the named
plaintiffs adequate representatives of the class if their interests did not
conflict with those of the absent class members1 36 and, second, to find
the named plaintiffs inadequate representatives if some members 13of7
the proposed class gained and others lost from the conduct at issue.
In regard to the first task, the Eleventh Circuit directed the trial
judge to assess whether there was a "fundamental" 138 conflict sufficient to render the named plaintiffs inadequate representatives of the
submitted affidavits from several large-volume purchasers stating that they did not believe
the litigation was in their "long-term interest." The court responded: "[T] he fact that an
illegally controlled potash market tends to favor the long-term interests of several large
not an interest the law is willing to protect" and'such
members of the putative class is ...

class members "are free to opt out." Id. at 692.
134. See, e.g., Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 327 (9th Cir.
1980) (any "windfall" is only that which was approved by the Supreme Court).
135. See Fuller, supra note 46, at 644 (questioning possibility of ordered legal system
that is not aimed toward good (or just or moral) ends).
136. In re Terazosin, 223 F.R.D. at 671.
137. Id.
138. Valley Drug,350 F.3d at 1189 (quoting 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1768,
at 326; 1 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 3, § 3.26, at 3-143 to -144).
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class. 139 On this point, the trial court was clear-"the evidence indicate[d] there [wa]s no class antagonism or conflict, much less a fundamental one."' 40 Many of the absent class members themselves,
including the three national wholesalers, offered affidavits stating that
their interests and objectives were aligned with the interests and objectives of the class representatives.14 1 Moreover, the three national
wholesalers, which the Eleventh Circuit suggested might be uninterested in or even opposed to the litigation, in fact represented to the
court that they did not perceive any conflict and, to the extent such a
conflict might exist, waived any objection. 14 2 They wanted the benefit
of the class litigation. 143 Finally, no concrete set of conflicting objec14 4
tives came to light in the renewed litigation on class certification.
Indeed, asked repeatedly for an example of such a conflict, Abbott's
counsel could offer none. When pressed by the trial court, Abbott's
vague response was:
For example, ifyou have parties that were actually not harmed out of
pocket, actually benefitted, might they approach the case differently than
parties who need to be compensated for actual losses? Might they have a
might. And this is part of the reason
different position on settlement? They
145
you don't get into the speculation.
46
In other words, Abbott could not identify any actual conflict at all.'
139.

In re Terazosin, 223 F.R.D. at 671.

140. Id. at 679.
141. Id. at 678-79. These affidavits were from twenty-three absent class members, including some that were identified by the court to participate in downstream discovery
which, in turn, was supposed to allow an assessment of whether the proposed class contained some members who suffered a net loss and some who enjoyed a net gain from the
conduct at issue. Id.
142. Id. at 679. These three national wholesalers suffered the bulk of the alleged damages of the proposed class. Id. at 678-79. The same national wholesalers had chosen not to
opt out of other similar litigation in the past, which had yielded them significant compensation. Id. at 679.
143. Id. Considering that the underlying purpose of the adequacy requirement is to
protect the interests of absent class members, an affidavit from an absent class member
attesting to its desire to participate in a class action should be conclusive regarding that
class member's interests.
144. Id. at 680.
145. Transcript of Oral Argument at 123, In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 223 F.R.D. 666 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (No. 99-MDL-1317).
146. Abbott's counsel, without apparent irony, dismissed the affidavits submitted by the
national wholesalers-in which they state they did not perceive a conflict and wished to
remain as class members-as "self-serving" because "All they are saying is, 'We want a free
check.' Why not? Who wouldn't sign that?" Id. at 149. In other words, defense counsel was
admitting that the litigation would benefit the national wholesalers, whether or not they
enjoyed a net benefit from any antitrust violation, just as the litigation would benefit class
members who suffered a net loss from the alleged antitrust violation. This argument was
tantamount to a concession that no conflict in fact existed between absent class members.
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All of this was consistent with the reality of the litigation. As the
trial court explained, "[T] he rights of the absent class members will
not be sacrificed or diminished [in class litigation], and advancing the
interests or maximizing the recovery of one member or subset of
members will not sacrifice the rights or diminish the recovery of any
other class member or members." 147 Based on the underlying purpose
of the adequacy requirement, no conflict existed. The natural conclusion should have been that the class should be certified. The problem,
however, was that the trial court did not perceive itself as having leeway to decide that issue on the merits.
The trial court understood itself to be constrained by a second
task on remand: to implement the specific directives of the Eleventh
Circuit. This required the trial court to abide by the rule which it understood the Eleventh Circuit to articulate: "A fundamental conflict
exists 'where some party members claim to have been harmed by the
same conduct that benefitted other members of the class.'"148 True,
the appellate opinion elsewhere said that when a class contains both
those who enjoyed a "net gain" and those who suffered a "net loss"
from a single course of conduct, a conflict is only "highly likely." 149
The trial court may have had more room to maneuver than it thought.
Still, its earlier decision to certify a class had been vacated, providing
the court with reason for caution.
Further, the trial court faced a real difficulty. It is not easy to craft
an exception to a rule that does not make any sense in the first place.
The trial court acknowledged that the representative plaintiffs "did
present logical arguments to support the conclusion that no fundamental antagonistic interest exists."' 5 0 But similar logical arguments
establish that the Eleventh Circuit's decision simply is not correct. No
conflict arises in direct purchaser litigation when a class includes some
net "winners" and some net "losers," a fact which the trial court appeared to appreciate. That put the trial court in a bind. It could have
carved out an exception to the Eleventh Circuit's ruling, but doing
so-on the basis that the net effects of an overcharge are irrelevant
under the direct purchaser rule-would seem to contravene the Eleventh Circuit's ruling.
147. Id. at 680 (citing Valley Drug, Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1189
(lth Cir. 2003)).
148. Id. at 673 (quotingValley Drug, 350 F.3d at 1189).
149. Valley Drug, 350 F.3d at 1193-94.
150. In re Terazosin, 223 F.R.D. at 678.
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Similar problems plagued the downstream discovery that the
Eleventh Circuit authorized the trial court to undertake. On remand,
the trial court allowed the defendants to conduct discovery in regard
to a sample of twenty-three absent class members.1 5 ' The court recognized that the discovery was "difficult not only because it involved the
novel area of downstream discovery of absent class members, but also
because of the logistical and mechanical issues that surfaced during
the process." 15 2 As a result, it was unsuccessful.
Most of the absent class members subjected to the discovery did
attempt to respond (a few did not). 153 However, of those that responded, for various reasons the production was generally insufficient
to separate net "winners" from net "losers." 154 The court acknowledged the "good-faith and diligent efforts made to compile th[e]
data." 155 However, mergers and consolidation in the industry, the
sheer volume of data, the need to create new data compilation programs, the large number of subpoenas outstanding from other litigation matters, honest mistakes, and the challenges of creating a
formula to analyze the data, combined to confound the effort.1 56 The
discovery did not yield a clear division between class members who
gained and class members who lost because of the defendants' actions.157 Of course, this outcome is unsurprising. The difficulty of this
very task was the catalyst for the Supreme Court's decisions in Hanover
Shoe and Illinois Brick.15 8 The Court adopted the direct purchaser rule
precisely because this sort of undertaking would "weigh[ ] down

151. Id. at 674.
152. Id. at 679.
153. Id. at 674.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 679.
158. The degree of difficulty might well have been caused by peculiar complications in
assessing, for example, the economic effects of the alleged antitrust violation on the three
national wholesalers, including that generic competition could increase margins, increase
leverage to negotiate purchase prices and rebates, lower capital and inventory costs, improve liquidity, create additional means of earning profits, and generate better return on
committed capital. See supra note 103. Discovery necessary to establish the effect of the
overcharge on individual plaintiffs might well be feasible if it were necessary to assess individual damages, as it is in indirect purchaser actions under some state antitrust laws. See,
e.g., In re Cipro Cases I and II, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 1286, at *21, *28-*31 (Ct. App. July
21, 2004) (holding class certification of California antitrust claims was appropriate even if
at some point the court must assess damages individually for each class member).
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'massive evidence and complicated

theories.' ",159
In response, the representative plaintiffs made several arguments
that individualized downstream discovery was unnecessary, including
that all of the direct purchasers would gain more from the recovery
based on the antitrust violation than they possibly could have gained
160
from the defendants' conduct.
The trial court acknowledged that the plaintiffs' analysis was "logical." 16 1 Indeed, it concluded that the plaintiffs' arguments and evidence sufficed to show there really was no conflict.1 62 But, that did not
matter. As the trial court explained, "[S] hould the Court accept any of
Plaintiffs' alternative approaches to satisfy the Eleventh Circuit mandate, the ordered downstream discovery of sales, volume, and rebate
data would have been an irrelevant academic exercise. Therefore, the
Court must conclude that none of the Plaintiffs' approaches satisfies
the Eleventh Circuit instructions.

' 163

In other words, when a trial

court is following directions from an appellate court that are unjusti159. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 741(1977) (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc.
v. United Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 (1968)). See also Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978), in which the Third Circuit
vacated the district court's denial of class certification. There, plaintiffs (gasoline retailers)
alleged they had been overcharged on purchases of gasoline by being forced to purchase
gasoline only from the oil company from which the retailer leased its service station. Id. at
439. The district court found that plaintiffs were required to prove the amount of their lost
profits, if any, as a result of defendants' conduct and that, because proving lost profits
would be complicated by "pass-on" issues, class certification was inappropriate. Bogosian v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F.R.D. 124, 138-39 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The Third Circuit agreed that proving the amount of pass-on and lost profits would be complicated, but, the court stated "it is
precisely for this reason that the Supreme Court eliminated the 'passing-on defense' in
Hanover Shoe, Inc." Bogosian, 561 F.2d at 456.
160. In re Terazosin, 223 F.R.D. at 676.
161. Id. at 677.
162. Id. at 680.
163. Id. at 678. This conclusion does not follow logically. The Eleventh Circuit did
authorize downstream discovery, but it did so on a limited record, and the opinion expressly invited a comparison, on remand, between, on the one hand, the amount of overcharge damages that a class member may be entitled to recover and, on the other hand,
the amount of the net economic benefit that the same class member obtained from defendants' conduct. Valley Drug, Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1193-96 (1lth
Cir. 2003). The record before the Eleventh Circuit did not allow this comparison. A showing that in general class members would benefit more from recovering the overcharge
than from the antitrust violation would obviate the need for downstream discovery and
permit class certification, while still satisfying the mandate of the Eleventh Circuit. That
said, the potential "tradeoff" conflict that the Eleventh Circuit identified still makes no
sense in light of the direct purchaser rule. Because the plaintiffs sought damages only for
past conduct, there is no "tradeoff" that any class member must make, and all class members are entitled to recover the full amount of the overcharge. Also, the Eleventh Circuit
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fled in the first place, the trial court cannot deviate from the instructions, even if doing so would better serve the purposes of the law.
Perhaps the only way to abide in good faith by a misdirected order is
to follow it to the letter. Recourse to the spirit of the law may appear
tantamount to insubordination. As a result, the trial court concluded
that the failure of the named plaintiffs to show which class members
were "winners," and which "losers," required denial of class
164
certification.
In an apparent effort to salvage the situation, the trial court nevertheless made factual findings sufficient to support the underlying
standard for adequacy in class actions. 165 The trial court explained,
"Based on this Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit's instructions, this renewed motion for class certification must be denied.
However, if the Court's reading of the opinion is inaccurate, these
alternate factual showings may satisfy the Eleventh Circuit's concerns." 16 6 Rare, indeed, is such a tortured effort by a trial court to
decide an issue correctly, even if the court failed to do so becasue it
felt obligated to follow errant orders from above.
Conclusion
Courts assessing potential conflicts between class members
should tread carefully. They may harm the very absent class members
they are obligated to protect. This danger is particularly grave when it
comes to the direct purchaser rule, which can lead courts astray, especially when they rely on doctrine developed in areas of the law subject
to the general principle that a plaintiff should recover only for the net
damages it suffered.
That is apparently what occurred in Valley Drug.The Eleventh Circuit and the district court (apparently against its better judgment) imposed on the national wholesalers, and other class members, discovery
did not have before it the affidavits from the national wholesalers attesting to their desire
to participate as class members.
164. In re Terazosin, 223 F.R.D. at 680. The court stated,
Except for the Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the Eleventh Circuit's directions
to determine net 'winners' and 'losers' to ensure a homogeneous class to avoid
any potential unforeseen conflict, the [trial] Court does not find a realistic possibility for fundamental antagonism. The economic realities, factual circumstances,
and superior efficiency seem to support certification of this class, but the clear
mandate of the Eleventh Circuit requires denial of the renewed motion.
Id.
165. Id. at 678-80.
166. Id. at 678 n.25.

Fall 2004]

SYMPOSIUM

173

about whether they profited from the alleged antitrust violation, even
though that issue had no proper bearing on the issue of class certification. In the name of protecting absent class members, then, the court
subjected them to an expensive and unnecessary burden. When this
discovery failed to yield clear answers about whether some direct purchasers made more profit, or less, as a result of an overcharge-an
issue the Supreme Court made irrelevant by its rulings in Hanover Shoe
and Illinois Brick-the result was that the class members' interests, as
the class members themselves expressed them in affidavits submitted
to the court, were sacrificed to avoid a chimerical class conflict. One
can only imagine the pious faces qf defendants as they advocate for
this approach in future cases.
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